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THE POLITICAL CULTURE of the antebellum United States
has been exercising historians ever since the professionaliza-
tion of their discipline in the late nineteenth century. During
the first half of the twentieth century most historians used
traditional paradigms to explain the volatile politics of the
1840s and 1850s. Focusing primarily on the activities of polit-
ical elites, they explained support for the Whig, Democratic,
and Republican parties in terms of the great national issues of
the day—tariffs, banking, and the expansion of slavery, to
name just three.' After the Second World War, however, a
growing interest in the social fabric of American politics
spawned research into the dynamics of party affiliation at the
grass roots. Much of that research focused on developments
at the state or regional level.^
In 1961 Lee Benson's pathbreaking study of New York
during the Jacksonian period stimulated a wide-ranging
debate over the bases of popular participation in American
politics during the formative years of the republic. Benson
argued that partisanship in New York was largely a product
of ethnicity and denominational attachment. Political organi-
I wish to thank my colleagues Dr. Sarah Barber and Dr. Richard
Carwardine for their comments on a draft of this article.
1. Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican
Party Before the Civil War (New York, 1970), 1-10, is a useful brief intro-
duction to the literature on the causes of the Civil War.
2. V. O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York, 1949) was a
pioneering study of voting behavior in a single region.
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zations attracted voters not primarily because they adopted
attractive policies but because their rhetoric, choice of candi-
dates, and overall worldview meshed with a voter's experi-
ence and values.^
Benson's "ethnocultural" interpretation of New York poli-
tics challenged the traditional notion that antebellum voters
cast their ballots as issue-oriented individuals. The cultural
identity of groups, not support for antislavery or Henry
Clay's American system, explained party affiliation. Although
later works by Ronald Formisano, Paul Kleppner, and others
confirmed the ethnocultural interpretation, it did not go
unchallenged. Eric Foner's influential Free Soil, Free Labor,
Free Men and Michael Holt's provocative analysis of politics
in the 1850s, for example, cast doubt upon it by suggesting
that voters were more issue-conscious than Benson and other
ethnocultural historians claimed.*
By the early 1990s a new synthesis was beginning to
emerge. That synthesis took into account the findings of the
ethnoculturalists, but highlighted the links between party
affiliation and economic change. Fusing the new cultural his-
tory (grounded in the writings of anthropologist Clifford
Geertz and the British Marxist historian, E. P. Thompson), the
emerging "republican synthesis," modernization theory, and
the insights of the Benson school, historians such as Harry
Watson, Charles Sellers, and Bruce Levine posited that while
political affiliation in the antebellum period had diverse
social, ideological, and economic roots, the key to under-
standing the era lay in a phenomenon called the market revo-
lution.^ This helpful term—more comprehensive than George
3. Lee Benson, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test
Case (Princeton, 1961).
4. Ronald P. Formisano, The Birth of Mass Political Parties: Michigan, 1827-
1861 (Princeton, 1971); Paul Kleppner, The Cross of Culture: A Social Analy-
sis of Midwestern Politics, 1850-1900 (New York, 1970); Foner, Free Soil,
Free Labor, Free Men; Michael Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (New
York, 1978).
5. Clifford Geertz's contribution to the synthesis is encapsulated in "Ideol-
ogy as a Cultural System," in David Apter, ed.. Ideology and Discontent
(New York, 1964), 47-76. Edward P. Thompson, The Making of the English
Working Class (London, 1963), provided the model for several sparkling
studies of early American labor, most notably Sean Wilentz, Chants Demo-
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R. Taylor's "transportation revolution/ coined in the 1950s—
denotes the transformation of the United States in the space
of roughly seventy years (1790-1860) from a relatively sim-
ple, preindustrial society to an increasingly complex, modern
economy.*
The agency of this transformation, commercial-industrial
capitalism, had a critical impact on the institutions and social
fabric of the nation, prompting seismic shifts in the loci of
political and economic power, and forcing a rearrangement of
the traditional bonds among individuals and groups alike.
Master craftsmen became capitalist entrepreneurs; journey-
men found themselves subsumed within the ranks of an
incipient proletariat; and middle-class women were relegated
to the domestic sphere.^ Joint stock corporations rose and fell
with the economic cycles; increasing numbers of black slaves
toiled on southern plantations to fuel the consumer boom in
North America and Europe; and thousands of eastern farm
families migrated westward to capitalize on the growing
demand for foodstuffs. The nation's spatial and qualitative
economic growth undermined the old certainties such as sta-
tus and kinship networks by promoting occupational and
geographical mobility. The inevitable search for security,
order, and control led people to turn to new institutions or to
cratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-
1850 (New York, 1984); and Bruce Laurie, Working People of Philadelphia,
1800-1850 (Philadelphia, 1980). For an introduction to the growing corpus
of work on republican ideology in the United States, see Robert E.
Shallhope, "Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Under-
standing of Republicanism in American Historiography," William and Mary
Quarterly 29 (1972), 49-80; and Daniel T. Rodgers, "Republicanism: The
Career of a Concept," Journal of American History 79 (1992), 11-38. The
best attempt to analyze American development in terms of the moderniza-
tion process is Richard Brown, Modernization: The Transformation of Ameri-
can Life, 1600-1865 (New York, 1976). the concept of the market revolu-
tion has been developed by, among others, Harry L. Watson, Liberty and
Power. The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York, 1990); Charles G. Sell-
ers, The Market Revolution and Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York,
1991); and Bruce Levine, Half Slave and Half Free: The Roots of Civil War
(New York, 1992).
6. George R. Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (New York,
1951).
7. On the evolution of the American working class, see Bruce Laurie, Arti-
sans into Workers: Labor in Nineteenth-Century America (New York 1989).
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try to revitalize old ones. Churches, trade unions, masonic
lodges, and political parties were swept by the winds of
change as reformers and conservatives sought new agendas,
notably, Sabbatarianism, temperance, and land reform. A
wave of Catholic immigration from Europe after 1830 added
to the confusion. So too did the birth of the abolitionist
movement in the same decade. In short, the latest historical
research has revealed the market revolution to have been an
agent of unparalleled social ferment, and one with important
consequences for our understanding of antebellum politics.
Iowa, of course, participated fully in this transformation.
In fact, its period of greatest demographic, economic, and
institutional expansion coincided exactly with its encounter
with the market revolution. Strangely, however, the state's
antebellum political culture has been sadly neglected. Impor-
tant monographs on individual politicians and the early
Republican party do exist, but they do not answer the ques-
tions that historians of American party politics are now ask-
ing.* The old debates over whether the state's Republican
party was ideologically sound on the issue of race or whether
its leaders were hand in glove with the railroads need
recontextualizing in the wake of the new scholarship.
That is the task of this essay. Fortunately, in the past
three decades scholars have produced a number of sophisti-
8. Morton Rosenberg, Iowa on the Eve of the Civil War: A Decade of Frontier
Politics (Norman, OK, 1972), is the most reliable account of antebellum
Iowa politics. Important, if old-fashioned, biographies include William
Salter, The Life of James W. Grimes (New York, 1876), and Dan Elbert Clark,
Samuel Jordan Kirkwood (Iowa City, 1917). Other states have been better
served, and Iowa itself has been the focus of important ethnocultural stud-
ies of the late nineteenth century. Significant studies of other states include
Stephen L. Hansen, The Making of the Third Party System: Voters and Parties
in Illinois, 1850-1876 (Ann Arbor, MI, 1980); Stephen E. Maizlish, The Tri-
umph of Sectionalism: The Transformation of Ohio Politics, 1844-1856 (Kent,
OH, 1983); Dale Baum, The Civil War Party System: The Case of Massachu-
setts, 1848-1876 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1984). Ethnocultural studies of politics
in the late nineteenth century in which Iowa figures prominently include
Richard J. Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict,
1888-1896 (Chicago, 1971); and Ballard C. Campbell, Representative
Democracy: Public Policy and Midwestern Legislatures in the Late Nineteenth
Century (Cambridge, MA, 1980).
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cated studies of the early Iowa economy.' By synthesizing this
literature with recent work on party politics in the antebellum
United States, one can sketch the political culture of ante-
bellum Iowa in a way that offers a fresh perspective for stu-
dents of Iowa politics while adding Iowa's experience to the
record of the national experience. The overview begins by
investigating the impact of the market revolution on the
trans-Mississippi West. Debates generated by the adaptation
to~ new market conditions reveal the fundamental dynamics
of interparty competition during a period when expanding
population and economic growth were transforming the face
of the prairies. Jacksonian Democracy claimed the allegiance
of a majority of Iowa voters in the 1840s, but material and
ethnocultural divisions arising from the processes of change
played a key role in promoting a relatively healthy two-party
system on the west bank of the Mississippi River. This second
party system broke down in the late 1840s and 1850s, how-
ever, undermined by escalating ethnocultural and sectional
divisions. The third party system emerged in the late 1850s
and 1860s out of the ruins of the second.
THE MARKET REVOLUTION came quickly to the wooded
river valleys and open prairies of Iowa. The United States
was barely a trans-Appalachian power when it emerged from
the Revolution, and the Mississippi valley was a thinly popu-
lated region under the nominal control of France. Jefferson's
purchase of Louisiana gave the new republic sovereignty over
the country, but it remained thinly settled until population
growth in the East, burgeoning European and domestic de-
9. Insightful modern studies of the early Iowa and midwestern economies
include Allan G. Bogue, From Prairie to Corn Belt: Farming on the Illinois
and Iowa Prairies in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1963); Robert P.
Swierenga, Pioneers and Profits: Land Speculation on the Iowa Frontier
(Ames, 1968); idem. Acres for Cents: Delinquent Tax Auctions in Frontier
Iowa (Westport, CT, 1976); Erling A. Erickson, Banking in Frontier Iowa,
1836-1865 (Ames, 1971); Donald L. Winters; Farmers Without Farms: Agri-
cultural Tenancy in Nineteenth Century Iowa (Westport, CT, 1978); leremy
Atack and Fred Bateman, To Their Own Soil: Agriculture in the Antebellum
North (Ames, 1987); Timothy Mahoney, River Towns in the Great West: The
Structure of Provincial Urbanization in the American Midwest, 1820-1870
(Cambridge, 1990).
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mand for foodstuffs (principally grain), and technological
advances such as the steamboat and the cotton gin opened
up the area to white settlement on a massive scale. Although
whites had long been interested in the lead mines centered
around Galena and Dubuque, colonization of the future terri-
tory of Iowa did not begin in earnest until after the Black
Hawk Purchase of 1832. By 1844, the white male citizens of
Iowa were ready to write their own constitution and apply for
admission to the American Union. Granted generous borders
by Congress in 1846, they prepared to make a garden of
what, from their perspective, had hitherto been an unproduc-
tive wilderness.^"
The market revolution had an immediate impact on
Iowa, bringing about the rapid destruction of the indigenous
civilizations. Tribes such as the Sauk and Mesquakie, the
Winnebago and the Potawatomi found their self-sufficient,
communal societies swept aside by the tide of white settlers
who crossed the Mississippi after 1832. Within twenty years
these tribes had been banished from Iowa. The few natives
who remained were forced to make concessions to Euro-
American mores. Even the fierce resistance of the Sioux had
been broken by the time the Civil War began in 1861." The
tragedy of these peoples was not unlike that of other hunter-
gatherers in other parts of the globe: the San in Cape Colony,
the aborigines of Australia and Tasmania, the indigenous
peoples of the Brazilian interior. All discovered that technol-
ogy, demography, and disease were usually on the side of the
white intruders and that the spirits of their ancestors were no
match for crusading Christianity (Protestant or Catholic).
Replacing the hunting and gathering economies of the
indigenous tribes was a dynamic form of commercial capital-
ism that had already begun to transform white communities
back east. All of Iowa's early settlers had felt the effects of
this new force: some, such as the agricultural migrants from
New England and the South, may have been casualties; oth-
10. For a reliable account of the political and socioeconomic development
of prestatehood Iowa, see Leland L. Sage, A History of Iowa (Ames, 1974),
52-79.
11. Ibid., 45-51, 58-59, 70-72, 107-8.
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ers, particularly farsighted merchants and eastern farmers
with capital, had benefited from it. The economy the early
settlers helped to construct was a complex and changing one,
but its initial vitality lay in the export of foodstuffs.^^ Farm
prices were buoyant for much of the 1830s and 1840s, pro-
viding incentives for grain producers to purchase and
improve fertile land in the West. With the federal government
keen to dispose of public lands at relatively cheap prices,
speculators with access to credit had no difficulty gaining
control of vast acreages and selling them off to migrant farm-
ers for a profit. At the same time that land sales were taking
place, villages and towns began to spring up, first along the
major river courses, then on the open prairies themselves.
These urban centers competed vigorously for the export trade
of the region, serviced the consumer demands of their hinter-
lands, and, in the case of the largest of them on the Missis-
sippi, dispatched the foodstuffs to St. Louis or Chicago. By
the late 1840s, small cities such as Dubuque, Davenport,
Keokuk, and Burlington were processing significant quantities
of local meat and grain themselves.
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE of the young state was deter-
mined largely by the expanding commercial economy of the
upper Mississippi valley. At the top of the scale were,
unsurprisingly, those with money and land: prosperous farm-
ers in the countryside, wealthy merchants and lawyers in the
towns. Each of these groups speculated heavily in real estate
during the 1840s, capitalizing on rising prices to build up and
entrench their dominant position in society. ^ ^ A thriving mid-
12. The growth of commercial farming in Iowa is the subject of several
studies, but see especially Mildred Throne, "Southern Iowa Agriculture,
1833-1890: The Progress from Subsistence to Commercial Corn-Belt Farm-
ing," Agricultural History 23 (1949), 124-30; Earle D. Ross, Iowa Agricul-
ture: An Historical Survey (Iowa City, 1951), 12-50. Mahoney, River Towns,
places early Iowa's economic development firmly in a regional context. For
details of one of antebellum Iowa's most significant food-processing indus-
tries, see Margaret Walsh, The Rise of the Midwestern Meat Packing Industry
(Lexington, KY 1982). .
13. Swierenga, Pioneers and Profits, 101-2; Allan G. Bogue, "The Iowa
Claim Clubs: Symbol and Substance," Mississippi Valley Historical Review
45 (1958), 231-53.
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die class consisting of millers, commercial farmers, grocers,
professionals, and skilled workers developed quickly as the
fluid frontier gave way to more mature (if by no means rigid)
patterns of settlement. Poorer squatters, itinerants, and
unskilled farm and urban workers made up the lower sorts.
Many of this latter group were European migrants. Irish
Catholics were particularly conspicuous as manual laborers in
the river cities; a few were free blacks from the Old North-
west and the upper South.^*
Iowa's antebellum political leadership was composed
largely of white males drawn from the upper and middle
ranks of society. This too was hardly surprising. Wealth gave
people access to education, connections, leisure time, and
power. In geographical terms it made them more persistent—
more committed to one particular location, less inclined to
keep moving on in pursuit of the American Dream. ^ ^ Even
though early Iowa was a rhetorically egalitarian and (in rela-
tive terms) politically democratic society, poor men seldom
found their way into the state legislature, let alone the United
States Congress. Notwithstanding Frederick Jackson Turner's
frontier thesis, substantial settlers (be they self-made men or
the beneficiaries of inherited wealth) dominated political life
in Iowa during the antebellum years.
How did members of the state's socioeconomic elite
manage to maintain their hold on power in an age when aris-
tocratic notions and ostentatious shows of wealth were hardly
de rigueur for aspiring officeholders? What, to rephrase the
question in more scientific terms, were the key elements of
linkage between elites and masses in early Iowa? To answer
14. No one has systematically analyzed class formation in antebellum
Iowa. My comments here are derived principally from my own trawls
through the 1850 and 1860 federal manuscript censuses. Relevant local
studies include George A. Boeck, "An Early Iowa Community: Aspects of
Economic, Social, and Political Development in Burlington, Iowa, 1833-
1866" (Ph.D. diss. University of Iowa, 1961), chaps. 2, 4, 7, 10; and David
W. Galenson and Clayne L. Pope, "Economic and Geographic Mobility on
the Farming Frontier: Evidence from Appanoose County, Iowa, 1850-
1870," Journal of Economic History 49 (1989), 635-55. On Iowa blacks
before the Civil War, see James L. Hill, "Migration of Blacks to Iowa, 1820-
1960," Journal of Negro History 66 (1966), 289-303.
15. Galenson and Pope, "Economic and Geographic Mobility," 644.
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this question properly we need to probe the political culture
of the day, for this complex phenomenon conferred legiti-
macy upon government and thereby provided one of the
most important social gels of the age.
THE STATE'S POLITICAL CULTURE was a dynamic one,
forged out of a constant dialogue among the voters, their rep-
resentatives, and, increasingly, the partisan press. One might
even go so far as to say that the dialogue was as fertile as the
soil on which it took place. Put simply, it consisted of a set of
primary and secondary values. The primary values were
shared in common by white Iowans and provided rich fiber
for the growth of what was one of the most democratic socie-
ties in the western world in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury. The secondary values were the roots of a highly com-
petitive two-party system whose seeds had been blown across
the Mississippi from the East.
The primary values need not detain us long. They were
ones held by nearly all native-born white Americans in this
period: a deep commitment to republican government, the
sovereignty of the people, and the developing concept of
meritocracy. The sources of these values were American
nationalism and the Bible. All native-born Iowans had been
reared on the myths of the Revolution—they knew from
what their schoolteachers and parents had told them that the
nation had been founded by heroes, that republican govern-
ments were superior to monarchies, and that the United
States was a haven from the corruptions of the Old World.
The vast majority of Iowans had no doubt, too, that there
was a God—an inscrutable and capricious one, perhaps, but
a God nonetheless. They knew this because they had been
listening to stories from the Old and New Testaments since
their birth. Denominational allegiance complicated matters,
but every Iowan knew the worth of individual responsibility
and self-discipline, even if they did not always practice what
they had been taught. Republican and Christian values were
reinforced by the growth of the new commercial economy:
free labor capitalism meant that one had to sink or swim on
one's own merits. Perhaps this had always been the case,
even in preindustial societies. But at least in the old days
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communities and kinship networks had provided some kind
of safety net. Nineteenth-century economic development
continued to erode traditional society, forcing Americans—
Iowans included—increasingly to fall back on their own
devices.
Local politics would have been a dull affair had they
been shaped solely by these fundamental cultural values.
What gave political conflict its edge on the prairies were the
debates occasioned by commitment to these values. Everyone
agreed that republicanism was a good thing, but how was
republicanism to be defined? How was it to be protected in a
rapidly changing world? Who was to protect it: government
or the people themselves? Religion did much to shape
Iowans' worldview, but what sort of Christian country was
America, was Iowa, supposed to be? A Protestant one pre-
sumably, but which variant of Protestantism was to hold
sway: evangelical or liturgical, Methodist or Baptist? Most
people accepted that the influence of the market economy
was healthy (it did after all lead to progress), but what role
should the people and their representatives take in control-
ling and nurturing it? Should they, indeed, make any attempt
to interfere with forces that many economists claimed had
their own irrepressible dynamic? And what of the institutions
thrown up by the market: banks, railroad corporations, and
textile mills? Should they be left to their own devices, or
should they be reined in as threats to the public good?
THE FIERCE INTERPARTY COMPETITION of the 1840s
and 1850s emerged from the debates over such broad ques-
tions and the secondary values they spawned. The parties
themselves, some more influential and long-lived than oth-
ers, exercised a remarkable influence over the lives of most
Iowans from the territorial period onwards. They did so be-
cause most people—even women who could not vote—
perceived them as legitimate governing entities and effective
media of public opinion.
Political parties did not gain legitimacy automatically,
however. The only way the major organizations—Democrats,
Whigs, and Republicans—secured it was by convincing sub-
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stantial sections of the electorate that they were representing
the interests of the people and the republic. Each did this
in rather different ways, but all tailored their appeals from
the ideological cloth outlined above—specifically by identi-
fying credible threats to Protestant-Republican values and
institutions.
Jacksonian Democrats (regnant at first the territorial and
then the state level until 1854) captured a majority of the
electorate largely by pursuing a policy of negative govern-
ment and free market economics. Government meddling in
the affairs of the people, they argued, portended the kinds of
tyranny perpetrated by the British before the Revolution.
Democrats pointed to institutions such as the Second Bank of
the United States and (closer to home) the Miners' Bank of
Dubuque as evidence of corrupt power sources created by
legislative fiat.^ ^ Although by no means opposed to the com-
mercial economy, they held that government should not
immerse itself unduly in matters best left to market forces. In
practical terms that meant that Democrats objected to grant-
ing special favors to individual transportation companies and
were generally suspicious of banking corporations. The 1846
Iowa Constitution, a largely Jacksonian creation, prohibited
lowans from setting up banks within the confines of the
state.^^ The legal code of 1851 was another product of Demo-
cratic rule. It included a general incorporation law that ended
the cumbersome practice of chartering joint-stock companies
one by one.^ ^
Iowa Democrats, like their copartisans in other regions of
the United States, fought against governmental intervention
in all walks of life, not just the economic sphere. In particular,
they opposed efforts by evangelical Protestants to use gov-
ernmental power to reform antebellum America's turbulent
society in their own image." Campaigns to prohibit liquor
16. See Erickson, Banking in Frontier Iowa, 16-35, for an account of the
Jacksonians' successful assault on the Miners' Bank.
17. Ibid., 47; Journal of the Convention for the Formation of a Constitution of
the State of Iowa (Iowa City, 1846), 85-86.
18. Iowa Code § 43.10 (1851).
19. Democratic resistance to evangelical interference in government was
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sales, abolish slavery, and maintain the sanctity of the sab-
bath were anathema to many Democrats because they
smacked of interference in the lives of a free people. Far from
promoting order and discipline, contended Jacksonians, such
campaigns caused social unrest and, in the case of the aboli-
tion movement, threatened the very fabric of the Union.
Expressing complete confidence in the people, these stan-
dard-bearers of laissez-faire explicitly rejected the notion that
economic growth and moral reform required the heavy hand
of government.
Whigs were not convinced by such reasoning. In their
view Iowa could not hope to take full advantage of eastern
demand for western grain without federal and local govern-
ment aid. The Whigs' central contention was that notwith-
standing the fertility of the prairies, the land was valueless
until it was first improved—tilled, fenced, and well-stocked
with animals—and then linked to the market by an efficient
financial and transport infrastructure. Iowans needed plank
roads, navigable rivers, railroads, banks, and credit. With-
out these accoutrements of a modern economy, they would
surely lose out in market competition with the inhabitants
of other western states. The prairies would remain a wilder-
ness unless they were integrated properly into America's ex-
panding commercial nexus by public-spirited legislators and
judges.^°
Throughout their party's short-lived existence (1840-c.
1855), Iowa Whigs campaigned relentlessly for public assist-
ance to be given to fledgling corporations (banks, railroads,
and milling companies). They fought to obstruct the Demo-
crats' assault on the Miners' Bank of Dubuque and unreserv-
highlighted at the 1844 constitutional convention when Jacksonian dele-
gates resisted a Whig motion to open the daily proceedings with prayer.
Benjamin F. Shambaugh, Fragments of the Debates of the Iowa Constitutional
Conventions of 1844 and 1846 ... (Iowa City, 1900), 21-22.
20. The best introduction to Iowa Whiggery remains Louis Pelzer, "The
History and Principles of the Whigs of the Territory of Iowa," Iowa Journal
of History and Politics 5 (1907), 46-90. On the ideology of the national
Whig party, see Daniel W. Howe, The Political Culture of the American
Whigs (Chicago, 1979). For a representative summary of Whig economic
policy in the 1840s, see William Penn Clarke's critique of the 1846 consti-
tution in Howe, Political Culture, 349-52.
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edly welcomed the railroad as the harbinger of modern civili-
zation.^^ Like the Jacksonians, they too extended their philos-
ophy of government into the private sphere. Having rather
less confidence in the masses than their opponents, however,
Whigs tended to favor using the legislature and courts to
enforce basic standards of Protestant morality. Much (though
by no means all) of the support for the so-called blue laws
against gambling, desecration of the sabbath, and drinking
came from Whigs.^ ^ So too did the modicum of legislative
opposition to the state's virulently racist stance on black
Race, in fact, was an integral element in the political cul-
ture of the day.24 Both major parties in the 1840s were racist,
but while the Democrats were virulently Negrophobic, Whigs
tended to be more paternalistic in their attitude towards
blacks. This was partly a consequence of their different con-
stituencies, but also a result of their divergent views of soci-
ety. The Democrats' broad definition of political society (all
adult white male citizens of the republic) was only possible
21. Whig support for the Miners' Bank was evident in the 1844 Iowa
House when James Grimes of Burlington fought to introduce a substitute
bill designed to stave off repeal of the bank's charter. 1844 Iowa Territorial
House Journal, 76. Whig strength in the Council (the upper house) gave the
bank a temporary stay of execution, but a Democrat-controlled legislature
killed off the institution the following year.
22. Iowa House Whigs voted 10-1 to support an act to punish gaming in
1843. 1843 Iowa Territorial House Journal, 190. In the same session of the
Iowa legislature. Whig support for a Sabbatarian bill was consistently
stronger than that of their opponents. Ibid., 129, 134-35; and 1843 Iowa
Territorial Council Journal, 104, 117. Iowa Whigs publicly endorsed temper-
ance at their state convention in February 1854. Herbert S. Fairall, The
Iowa City Republican Manual of Iowa Politics (Iowa City, 1881), 38. They
gave almost full support to a prohibitory liquor law at the ensuing session
of the General Assembly. 1855 Iowa Senate Journal, 201; and 1855 Iowa
House Journal, 229-30. Although these measures would not have passed
without Democratic support, Jacksonian members provided the bulk of
opposition to each of them.
23. The Iowa legislature restricted the entry of blacks into the territory in
1839. Whig opposition to the law is noted in Robert R. Dykstra, "White
Men, Black Laws: Territorial Iowans and Civil Rights, 1838-1843," Annals
of Iowa 46 (1982), 422.
24. See Robert R. Dykstra, Bright Radical Star: Black Freedom and White
Supremacy on the Hawkeye Frontier (Cambridge, MA, 1993).
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because they excluded a wide range of groups from it." Pos-
iting the inferiority of African-Americans (as well as Ameri-
can Indians) made it easier for them to claim that all white
men were equal under the law. The more conservative Whigs
possessed a hierarchical, but in some ways more inclusive,
worldview that encompassed "inferior" races, although the
former were in no doubt that the vast majority of such peo-
ples were destined to occupy a position at the foot of the
social scale (perhaps with a few lower-class whites who had
failed to better themselves). The Democrats' preoccupa-
tion with race, however, made them much more tolerant of
poverty-stricken European immigrants than the Whigs, whose
suspicion of the lower sorts frequently rendered them xeno-
phobic.^^ Religious divisions exacerbated racial and ethnic
differences between the two parties in Iowa. Many evangeli-
cal Whigs advocated the use of government to create a truly
Protestant republic—by preventing liquor sales, for example,
or (in rather fewer cases) by opposing the state's official
endorsement of white supremacy. They were therefore
inclined to oppose the rising political influence of Irish Cath-
olics, for the latter were renowned for their drinking and
reluctance to support the crusade against slavery.^^ Demo-
crats, on the other hand, endorsed cultural pluralism as a
vital component of republican ideology and rejected Whig
criticisms of foreign immigrants.
More township-level research needs to be done on the
precise nature of the two major parties' constituencies in
25. John Ashworth, "Agrarians" and "Aristocrats": Party Political Ideology in
the United States, 1837-1846 (London, 1983), 221-23. Ashworth concedes
that Jacksonian theory was unable to encompass African-Americans, but
he deemphasizes racism as a component of the Democrats' worldview.
Jean Baker, Affairs of Party: The Political Culture of Northern Democrats in
the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Ithaca, NY, 1983), 212-58, redresses the
balance.
26. Bruce Collins, "The Ideology of the Ante-bellum Northern Demo-
crats," Journal of American Studies 11 (1977), 103-21, stresses the Demo-
crats' emphasis on cultural pluralism.
27. The links between temperance and nativism are explored in Ronald F.
Matthias, "The Know Nothing Movement in Iowa" (Ph.D. diss.. University
of Chicago, 1965), chap. 1.
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^ We know enough, however, to sketch the social and
ethnic composition of both the leadership and their partisan
supporters. Whig and Democratic leaders were generally
wealthy men—mostly attorneys from the eastern and south-
ern states who speculated heavily in real estate or at the very
least found the law a remunerative profession in a frontier
region beset by rival land claims and horse thieving. Most of
them had been born in the United States, had received an
above average education, and resided in the larger urban cen-
ters of the state.^^ These factors gave them enormous ad-
vantages over the vast majority of their constituents; town-
dwelling, for example, made them more cosmopolitan, more
aware of what was happening in the world around them, and
placed them closer to the main concentrations of capital in
both the state and the nation. As boosters, they were fre-
quently at the center of the intense interurban competition
for the trade of the backcountry that took place in Iowa
before the Civil War. Prominent lawyers such as Charles
Mason and James Grimes, for example, endeavored to place
their home town of Burlington ahead of Keokuk in the race
for railroad connections to the East.^ " The fact that Mason
was a committed Democrat and Grimes a rising star in the
local Whig party indicates the prevalence of intraelite cooper-
ation behind the scenes. All Iowans shared a commitment to
economic growth (not to mention personal profit), but politi-
cally active lawyers and their mercantile allies were better
placed than most settlers to benefit from the processes of
change.
28. The importance of applying multivariate techniques to random town-
ship data in order to determine grass-roots voting behavior is stressed by I.
Morgan Kousser, "The 'New Political History': A Methodological Critique,"
Reviews in American History 4 (1976), 1-14. Township statistics figure
prominently in Dykstra, Bright Radical Star.
29. See the sketches in Edward H. Stiles, Recollections and Sketches of Not-
able Lawyers and Public Men of Early Iowa (Des Moines, 1916).
30. See, for example, James Grimes to Charles Mason, 13 February 1852,
Charles Mason Papers, State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines.
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The parties' constituents were a polyglot bunch.^^ In
ethnoreligious terms, the Democrats fared better among
European immigrants than the Whigs: Catholic Irish and Ger-
mans were particularly devoted to the Jacksonian cause,
partly because the Democrats appeared to be less ethnocen-
tric than the Whigs, and partly because the Whig party was
perceived as a vehicle for bigoted evangelical Protestantism.
Many of the upcountry southerners who migrated to Iowa in
the late 1830s and 1840s were also Democrats, principally
because they had opposed the dominance of large Whig
slaveholders in states such as Tennessee and Virginia. Many
of these people were Baptists and Methodists, and were natu-
rally suspicious of the more Yankeefied denominations that
were at the forefront of moral reform in the antebellum per-
iod, principally Congregationalists and Presbyterians. In
Iowa, hard-pressed Whigs drew a good deal of support from
members of these latter churches, as well as from areas of
Quaker settiement, such as Henry County in the southeast.
New Englanders and British immigrants appear to have
favored the Whig party, too, not only because of its moral
concerns but also due to its generally Anglophile ethos.
Class, too, may have played an important role in Iowa
politics before the mid-1850s. Although we know that the
leaders of both parties came from the middling and upper
ranks of society, there is no hard evidence to show that
wealth and status seriously affected partisan attachments
among ordinary voters. However, work on political affiliation
in other American communities during the antebellum period
does indicate that Whigs performed better in urban areas and
31. There is no ethnocultural analysis of voting behavior in antebellum
Iowa. My speculative remarks in this paragraph are therefore based on vari-
ous stu(ies of Jacksonian politics, especially Watson, Liberty and Power, 194,
222-23; Richard Carwardine, "Evangelicals, Whigs and the Election of
William Henry Harrison," Journal of American Studies 17 (1983), 47-75; and
Kleppner, Cross of Culture, chap. 3. William E. Gienapp, The Origins of the
Republican Party, 1852-1856 (New York, 1987), 423-39; George H. Daniels,
"Immigrant Vote in the 1860 Election in the Case of Iowa," in Frederick C.
Luebke, ed.. Ethnic Voters and the Election of Lincoln (Lincoln, NE, 1971),
110-28; and Robert P. Swierenga, "The Ethnic Voter and the First Lincoln
Election," ibid., 129-50, support the view that there was a strong ethnic and
religious basis to popular voting behavior in antebellum Iowa.
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attracted a disproportionate amount of support from rela-
tively prosperous individuals integrated into the market econ-
omy.^ ^ Without township-level data it is impossible to say
whether a similar pattern was evident in early Iowa. The best
one can do is note that Whig and Democratic rhetoric was
redolent of class divisions. Democrats attacked their oppo-
nents as aristocrats and tools of eastern capital; they poured
flattery on ordinary settlers, courting the votes of work-
ingmen and independent-minded farmers.^^ Whigs, on the
other hand, spoke of a harmony of interests among classes,
and publicly identified themselves with banks and man-
ufacturers.^^ Such rhetoric clearly hinted at differences of
status and wealth between the parties' constituencies, al-
though ethnocultural divisions almost certainly cut across
class lines.
The main elements of interparty competition in Iowa
during the years of the second party system were thus eco-
nomic and ethnoreligious in origin. Arguably, however, it was
the system's primary focus on economic concerns that kept
the Democrats in power for so long. Specifically, their advo-
cacy of liberal land policies for western settlers (explicit in
their vocal support for a generous preemption law and
implicit in their vision of a republic of self-reliant yeomen
farmers) proved exceptionally popular with the electorate.^^
Even though the Whigs recognized the need to appeal to the
people in the same obsequious terms as the Democrats, they
never quite succeeded in casting off their image as social con-
servatives. Whig strategists clearly hoped that their endorse-
32. Watson, Liberty and Power, 236; Paul Goodman, "The Social Basis of
New England Politics in Jacksonian America," Journal of the Early Republic
6 (1986), 36-37.
33. For example, the 1841 Democratic platform attacked the Whigs as
blue-stockinged "Federalists," supported the passage of a preemption law
to safeguard the rights of "the hardy pioneer," and called for the destruc-
tion of the Bank of the United States. Fairall, Manual of Iowa Politics,
12-13.
34. Iowa Whig platforms in the 1840s consistently expressed support for
high tariffs (to boost domestic industry), government aid for internal
improvements, and banks of issue. Ibid., 14, 16-17, 22-23.
35. Democratic support for preemption was a key feature of the party's
1841 election platform. Ibid., 12-13.
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ment of economic growth and the institutions necessary to
promote it would capture the imagination of the public.
Would not everyone benefit, they reasoned, if the economic
pie got bigger thanks to the banks, the transportation compa-
nies, and, of course, the hard work of those who tilled the
soil? The answer may well have been yes, but in an age when
the Money Power was regarded as a serious threat to republi-
can liberties, such an argument was destined to fall on stony
ground.
Part of the problem was that the national Whig party
was manifestly unsympathetic to a generous policy of land
distribution in the West, but Iowa Whigs were also hindered
by the fact that the local economy was still immature enough
to permit their opponents to lambast banks and other corpo-
rations as monopolistic and predatory.^* When, in the late
1840s, population did expand beyond the immediate confines
of Iowa's navigable rivers and eastern railroads began to
approach the Mississippi, Whig party leaders found their
materialistic appeals undercut by the readiness of many
Democrats to tone down their agrarian rhetoric and welcome
the advent of the iron horse.^^ For the truth was that at first
all Iowans, regardless of their partisan allegiance, regarded
the railroads as a godsend. The new technology promised to
reduce the costs of transporting their foodstuffs to market
(most likely to Chicago, the emerging hub of the midwestern
economy, rather than to St. Louis) as well as to increase the
value of their property. Small wonder enthusiastic Iowa farm-
ers began voting local tax aid to railroads as soon as they
were given the opportunity in the early 1850s.''*
It is not easy to determine the role of issues in the politi-
cal culture of the day, but the careful thought that went into
drawing up election platforms suggests that the politicians
themselves were in no doubt that the voters responded to
36. For Jacksonian attacks on banking in the 1844 constitutional conven-
tion, see Shambaugh, Debates, 69-70.
37. Democratic support for railroads is detailed more fully in Robert Cook,
Baptism of Fire: The Republican Party in Iowa, 1838-1878 (forthcoming,
Ames, 1993), chap. 2.
38. John Lauritz Larson, Bonds of Enterprise: John Murray Forbes and West-
ern Development in America's Railway Age (Cambridge, MA, 1984), 59.
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more than just the sign-ridden language of their speeches.
Iowans rejected the constitution of 1844 because they wanted
larger borders for their state and (in some cases) a continua-
tion of low territorial property taxes.'^ Nor was it only local
issues to which they responded. When voters dumped the
Democrats in 1854, their decision was linked to their anger at
that party's congressional support for the despised Kansas-
Nebraska Act.''^  Of course, issues were often related to value
systems—evangelical Protestantism, Roman Catholicism,
working-class republicanism—but early Iowans were a practi-
cal people who wanted something more than symbolic ges-
tures from their representatives at Iowa City and Washington.
If those representatives did not respond to their wishes, then
they could always be ousted at the polls.
All this should not be taken to mean that a perfectly
democratic relationship existed between the leaders and the
led. Early Iowa was clearly not some kind of Turnerian fron-
tier Utopia. Most antebellum political parties sought power
not only to formulate policy but also to capture the spoils of
office. The United States at midcentury possessed no real
bureaucracy at the state or federal levels. The day-to-day
operation of government was carried out by political appoint-
ees aided by a few clerks who owed their position to the
workings of the patronage system. Loyal party workers in
townships across the state expected to gain some reward if
their organization triumphed at the biennial elections for gov-
ernor and legislature. Having attached themselves to, say, a
member or prospective member of the General Assembly,
they would then require the successful individual to promote
their efforts to become a federal postmaster at home or (in
the case of newspaper editors) win a contract to print public
documents. Officeholders further up the party hierarchy
could use their positions to establish profitable connections
with merchant capitalists (politicians in office were always
useful to eastern railroad magnates and local merchants) and,
by dispensing patronage as judiciously as possible, build up
39. Sage, History of Iowa, 84-88.
40. Cook, Baptism of Fire, chap. 2; Rosenberg, Iowa on the Eve of the Civil
War, chap. 4.
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durable power bases in Iowa. Factionalism was an obvious
consequence of the spoils system, for disappointed office
seekers were often swift to join alternative power networks in
an effort to feed at the public trough. The Dubuque Demo-
cratic party, for example, was riven by a dispute between
rival politicos during the late 1850s.*^
The struggle for spoils was fierce throughout the
antebellum years and makes it harder to pinpoint the motiva-
tion behind all the speeches and platform-making of the day.
Was the rhetoric of conspiracy, reform, and economic growth
genuinely policy-oriented, or was it really a smokescreen
behind which ambitious politicians could advance their own
selfish projects? There is no easy answer to this question.
Some individual Iowa politicians did regard politics as little
more than a game; "it's like ratting—fun," remarked one of
them.^2 Such men may have had little commitment to the
ideal of representative democracy or to the stated policies and
values of their party. That was probably not the case with
most antebellum politicians, however. All Iowa politicians
were ambitious—either for themselves, their cause, or most
probably both. That is hardly surprising, for they were, on
balance, no more nor less altruistic than their constituents.
What is striking is the degree of their loyalty to party; surpris-
ingly few Whigs, for example, regarded their organization's
persistently poor electoral performances as an excuse to jump
ship and run as Democrats. That was not simply because
they feared being exposed as traitors or "soreheads," but
rather because they had a strong sense of party allegiance.
Values as well as office motivated the majority of Iowa politi-
cians before the Civil War.
SUSTAINED AS IT WAS by such a diverse political culture,
why did the second party system begin to disintegrate in
Iowa in the late 1840s? Two major factors were to blame: the
increasing seriousness of the sectional conflict between North
and South; and a rise in prominence of ethnocultural issues
41. Rosenberg, Iowa on the Eve of the Civil War, 172.
42. lames Thorington to William Penn Clarke, 3 January 1857, William
Penn Clarke Papers, State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines.
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which began to undermine popular faith in the existing polit-
ical structure.
Iowa politics—even in the 1840s, when communications
with the rest of the United States were relatively primitive—
was by no means isolated from national affairs. Western vot-
ers were perfectly capable of responding to developments
occurring beyond the boundaries of the state: local papers
were full of national news and editorials telling them what to
think about the great issues of the day—the Mexican War, the
crisis with Britain over Oregon, the debates in Congress pre-
ceding the Compromise of 1850. Party platforms bristled
with planks about such faraway happenings, for party strate-
gists were well aware that it took more than the lS4iners' Bank
of Dubuque or the Scott County Hydraulic Company to
mobilize the voters.*^ As Michael Holt has rightly pointed
out, issue generation was what antebellum politics was all
about.** Without issues, voters could become dissatisfied and
lose interest in politics and politicians.
On balance, the Democrats got the best of the national
debate in the 1840s. Their emphasis on spatial rather than
qualitative economic expansion, confident assertions of
American nationalism, and glorification of the white republic
appealed more to pioneering folk than the Whigs' constant
harping on the need for government-aided economic growth.
What weakened the Democrats' grip on power in Iowa was
(ä) their reliance on the southern wing of the party at a time
when northerners were growing fearful of proslavery efforts
to undermine their liberties and (b) the destruction of the
minority Whig party and its replacement by a much more
formidable opposition.
Although both of these developments were connected,
the second was not wholly a product of the first. The Whig
party collapsed because its political leaders could not turn
changes within the political culture of the state to their own
advantage—at least not within the straitjacket imposed by
the existing party system. Growing population in the counties
43. See Fairall, Manual of Iowa Politics, 11-28, for Whig and Democratic
platforms in the 1840s.
44. Holt, Political Crisis, 102-3 and passim.
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west of the Mississippi and the inevitable maturation of what
had once been a rather crude frontier society prompted
increased support for the machinery of a modern economy.
The Whigs should have been able to make something of this,
but they found their efforts blocked by the readiness of the
Democrats to welcome the advent of the railroads from the
East and, in some cases, to support the removal of the consti-
tutional prohibition of banking.*^ At the same time. Whig
leaders were confronted with insistent calls from their evan-
gelical wing to legislate against liquor sales, put an end to the
desecration of the sabbath, and provide a stronger bulwark
against the dictates of the South. These demands drove a
wedge between National Whigs (supporters of the 1850
Compromise who generally abhorred agitation over "moral"
questions because of their divisive impact on the Union and
the party) and Free Soil Whigs, who believed not only that
the time had come to stand up to the blustering of south-
ern slaveholders, but also that an alliance with Iowa's small
band of political antislavery men could make the difference
between electoral success and failure.
At first it seemed that the fusionist strategy of the Free
Soil Whigs might liberate the state from the thraldom of the
Democrats. Adverse public reaction to Stephen Douglas's
attempts to abrogate the sacred Missouri Compromise early
in 1854 resulted in a Whig-Free Soil alliance prior to the
gubernatorial contest of that year.^ ^ The antislavery Whig,
James Grimes, won a narrow majority on the basis of his
opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act and an unashamedly
Whiggish campaign address extolling the virtues of positive
government.^^ No sooner had the Whigs finished celebrating
this dramatic victory, however, than their dreams of political
hegemony were shattered by an upsurge of political nativism
directed against Roman Catholic immigrants.
45. Erickson, Banking in Frontier Iowa, 96.
46. Sage, History of Iowa, 127-28.
47. The most recent and most sophisticated account of Grimes's guberna-
torial victory is in Gienapp, Origins of the Republican Party, 121-22.
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The Know Nothing party's reign in Iowa was brief but
eventful.''* Drawing impressive support during 1855 from
American-born artisans in the river towns, anti-Catholic
evangelicals, and southern migrants, the new party called for
curbs on the political and social influence of Catholic immi-
grants. Although Whig leaders had always evinced some
sympathy for nativism (not least because so many of the for-
eigners voted Democrat), their desire to win over Protestant
Cermans tended to mitigate their xenophobia. Thus, with the
Democrats generally sympathetic to the immigrants, frus-
trated Iowans had only the Know Nothings to turn to when
they found Catholic immigrants threatening both their jobs
and their cultural hegemony. Politicians from the major par-
ties were quick to jump on board the nativist bandwagon, for
it seemed that the latter would carry all before it. Remark-
ably, however, the Know Nothings vanished as quickly as
they had appeared. They did so because a much more dur-
able and powerful force came into its own during the winter
of 1855-56. That force was political antislavery.
The Republican party of Iowa was founded in February
1856.'" Its central tenet was simple: opposition to the spread
of slavery in the United States. Slavery had not bothered
most white Iowans during the 1840s and early 1850s. Few of
them liked it, but hardly anyone save a few abolitionists and
Free Soilers wanted to endanger the Union by campaigning
against it. What changed this reluctance to upset the apple
cart was the growing perception among all northerners, not
just Iowans, that the South was attempting to impose its
immoral and backward institution on the rest of the coun-
try. Northerners thought that such an attempt, evidenced by
the passage of the new Fugitive Slave Law and the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, amounted to a perversion of the ideals on
48. The only full-length account of political nativism in Iowa is Matthias,
"Know-Nothing Movement in Iowa."
49. The best accounts of the formation of the Republican party in Iowa are
Louis Pelzer, "The Origins and Organization of the Republican Party in
Iowa," Iowa Journal of History and Politics 4 (1906), 487-525; and David S.
Sparkes, "The Birth of the Republican Party in Iowa, 1848-1860" (Ph.D.
diss.. University of Chicago, 1951), chaps. 4-5.
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which the republic had been founded and threatened the
livelihood of free, independent citizens.^"
The once preposterous notion that a tiny group of wealthy
planters—the "slave power" in contemporary parlance—was
plotting to destroy the rights of northerners took on added
significance in late 1855 when a fierce guerrilla war involving
free state and proslavery forces erupted in neighboring Kan-
sas.^^ That confhct presented leaders of the embryonic
Republican coalition with the proof they had been looking
for—proof that southern planters and their northern Demo-
crat allies were engaged in a vast conspiracy to spread slavery
across the United States. To a large extent, then, Iowa's
Republican strategists (most of whom had been Free Soil
Whigs) were able to capitalize on popular fears and expecta-
tions that hitherto had helped keep the Democrats in office
for so long: antipathy toward "aristocrats," concerns for the
welfare of free white labor, and a profound suspicion of
unrestrained power.
Opposition to the extension of slavery did not constitute
the only string to the Republican bow, however. Land reform,
a protective tariff, support for banking and railroads, tighter
voting restrictions on immigrants, qualified endorsement of
temperance, and even a popular referendum on black suf-
frage were all designed to add to the party's electoral appeal
between 1854 and 1860.^^ Such policies were carefully
crafted to win over different sections of the electorate except
voters who made up the Democrats' core constituency.
Protectionism and watered-down nativism, for example,
appealed to artisans in the river towns; endorsements of pro-
hibition and other moral reforms attracted mainstream evan-
gelical Protestants; and banking reform (backed by Republi-
50. James Grimes capitalized on these themes in his address "To the Peo-
ple of Iowa," issued in the early stage of his 1854 gubernatorial campaign.
See Salter, life, 39-50.
51. The role played by Kansas in Republican electoral successes during the
mid-1850s can be traced in Rosenberg, Iowa on the Eve of Civil War, chaps.
9-10; Sparkes, "Birth of the Republican Party," 146; and Cook, Baptism of
Fire, chap. 3.
52. For Republican platforms, 1856-1860, see Fairall, Manual of Iowa Poli-
tics, 40-41, 42-44, 46-51, 54.
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can delegates at thé 1857 constitutional convention in Iowa
City) must have been music to the ears of commercial farmers
desperate for reliable credit and currency facilities.^ ^ But in
the final analysis it was the Republicans' careful use (their
opponents would have said "manipulation") of the slave
power argument that enabled coalition builders to overcome
the Know Nothing challenge, broaden the base of the old
Whig constituency, and finally convert the new organization
into the majoritarian force in local politics.^*
Iowa Democrats struggled hard in the late 1850s to
regain their lost ascendancy. They sought to convince voters
that the Republicans were abolitionists, disunionists, and
advocates of miscegenation and to reactivate the former
Jacksonian coalition by attacking banks and Yankee
moralists.^^ Time and events, however, were against them.
Commercial farmers wanted an economic infrastructure fit
for the middle of the nineteenth century. The Republicans'
Whiggish emphasis on positive government was thus much
more conducive to their aims than the seemingly outmoded
laissez-faire policies of the Jacksonians. More significant than
this, however, was the fact that the South appeared to grow
even more hostile in the second half of the 1850s. The caning
of Charles Sumner, the national Democratic administration's
ill-judged attempts to impose a proslavery settlement on Kan-
sas, the Dred Scott decision, and aggressive southern calls for
a federal slave code for the territories did nothing to convince
Iowans that popular sovereignty—the Douglas Democrats'
local solution to the slavery question—was a solid enough
bulwark of northern rights. When war came in April 1861,
Iowa Democrats had little choice but to support the newly
53. Erickson, Banking in Frontier Iowa, 90-91; Sage, History of Iowa, 133-
49. Counties specializing in wheat production for the market were among
those switching from the Democrats to the anti-Nebraska coalition in the
1854 gubernatorial election.
54. On the Republicans' use of slave power rhetoric, see William E.
Gienapp, "The Republican Party and the Slave Power," in Robert H. Abzug
and Stephen H. Maizlish, eds.. New Perspectives on Race and Slavery: Essays
in Honor of Kenneth M. Stampp (Lexington, KY, 1986).
55. Cook, Baptism of Fire, chaps. 4-6; Rosenberg, Iowa on the Eve of the
Civil War, chaps. 9-10.
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elected Republican government of Abraham Lincoln. Their
world had turned upside down.
Antebellum Iowa's political culture was thus as vibrant
as the times. Economic change and ethnic variety, sectional-
ism and nationalism, republicanism and racism all combined
to promote fierce interparty competition in the region by pro-
viding political elites with a roster of concrete issues and
value-laden totems which they employed to mobilize the
people. Hindsight, however, reveals that a high price had to
be paid, for such richness. After thirteen thousand patriotic
Iowans perished in the ensuing struggle to prevent southern
slaveholders from destroying the American Union, a sterile
political culture grew up rapidly around Iowa's Grand Old
Party. Relying heavily on past glories. Republicans went on to
dominate state politics for nearly three-quarters of a century.
Aside from a brief flirtation with power between 1889 and
1893, local Democrats would not taste lasting political success
again until the advent of the New Deal.
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